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Abstract 
This paper seeks to explain the interactions involved in recruiting prospective student-athletes to 
universities, particularly in the sport of softball. By employing the concepts of Game Theory, 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Matching Markets, the market for recruiting is explored and explained. 
Recent legislative changes in the market are then examined as well as possible outcomes as a 
result. Research on commitments in softball and lacrosse was collected in order to make claims 
in regard to incentives. The market for recruiting is compared to the residency placement 
matching system. Ideas are presented on ways to achieve a market that clears where outcomes 
are said to be “efficient” while also drawing attention to differences in markets which could 
inhibit the same models from being effective in the recruiting market.  
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Introduction and Background  
There are more than 460,000 athletes that compete in intercollegiate athletics under the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). Across every sport, there exist recruiting 
relationships which come into effect to determine where a prospective student-athlete will attend 
school. A coach’s general objective is to maximize each student athletes’ potential in order to 
field the most competitive team possible. The student athletes’ objectives vary across a wide 
range of factors which impact their decisions in varying degrees. Some of these factors may 
include, but are not limited to, things like: playing time, geographic location, proximity to home, 
educational opportunities, scholarship offer/cost of attendance, competitiveness of the program, 
historic success, and relationship with the coach. Recruiting interactions often involve means of 
communication such as phone calls, text messages, e-mails, but also campus visits by the 
prospective student-athletes and/or home visits by the recruiting coach. Coaches of any sport 
spend countless hours traveling all over the country (occasionally the world) to evaluate the 
talent of prospective student-athletes.  
The NCAA is the governing body over the dominant majority of intercollegiate athletics. 
The scope of this paper will consider Division I (the highest level) institutions. The NCAA has a 
slew of rules defining permissible and impermissible recruiting interactions. However, even with 
a long list of restrictions on permissible recruiting activity, coaches have continually found 
loopholes in attempts to gain the upper hand and acquire the most coveted recruits. Specifically, 
with the advancements in technology and ease of communication, recruiting timelines have crept 
earlier and earlier into a prospective student-athlete’s high school career. In recent years, it hasn’t 
been abnormal to hear of athletes verbally committing to universities early as 7th grade. A 
“verbal commitment” is non-binding on neither the coach nor prospect according to NCAA 
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(2018) but is a normal component of the recruiting process. This verbal commitment tells of a 
prospective student-athlete’s intent to attend a particular university in response to some type of 
offer to do so from the coaching staff of that university. In sports other than football, verbal 
commitments tend to be carried out except for in extreme circumstances. Particularly among the 
conferences known as the Power 5 (ACC, Big 12, Big Ten, Pac-12, and SEC) the perceived need 
to obtain or maintain the upper hand has led to an increase in “early” recruiting in recent years. 
For the scope of this paper, early recruiting will refer to the practice of collegiate coaches 
offering scholarships and seeking to obtain a verbal commitment prior to the student athlete’s 
junior year of high school. Many of these programs claim to not want to recruit kids this early. 
However, because their competitors continue to do so, they feel as though they must as well or 
else risk missing out on securing high level prospects. Penn State women’s lacrosse coach, Karin 
Brower Corbett said of early recruiting, "It's about five schools driving this bus, and we all felt 
like we had to jump on board or we're left behind,” (Fadir, 2016).  
Recently, there have been pushes from coaching associations of different sports to enact 
changes in the realm of early recruiting. In April of 2017, lacrosse coaches became the first sport 
to make a compelling case and get proposed legislation before the NCAA for such changes. The 
proposal was passed and placed in immediate effect. Below is a table comparing prior NCAA 
legislation (listed as “current” in the chart because of the time which it was published), a Student 
Athlete Experience Committee (SAEC) proposal (approved by NCAA in April 2018 for all other 
sports), and the current lacrosse legislation (now applied to softball as well). Note the “Current 
Lacrosse Recruiting Rules” column, primarily in contrast to “Current NCAA Recruiting Rules”. 
All contact with prospective recruits is now moved to September 1 of the prospect’s junior year.  
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Figure 1. Explanation of NCAA Legislation taken from: NFCA Current Recruiting Rules and Pending Legislation. 
NFCA, Jan. 2018. 
 In December of 2017 softball coaches under the National Fastpitch Coaches Association 
(NFCA) began a push to be included on the lacrosse legislation. In April of 2018, the NCAA 
passed legislation to include softball on the lacrosse legislation that was passed in 2017. As 
reflected in the above figure, the most critical element of this legislation in comparison to what 
existed previously, as well as other changes enacted for other sports (the SAEC proposal), is that 
there is absolutely no contact between a prospective student-athlete and a collegiate coach before 
September 1 of the prospective student-athlete’s junior year of high school. To date, lacrosse and 
softball are the only sports under which such restrictions exist. In all other sports, while there are 
restrictions on coach behavior, there is no restriction on the prospective student-athlete. If a 
prospective student-athlete calls a collegiate coach, the coach is able to answer and make any 
offer (financial or otherwise) or schedule a visit—there are no limitations on what can transpire 
if the prospective student-athlete initiates the call. The same is true if the prospective student-
athlete (that is not yet a junior in high school) decides to show up on campus. They are able to 
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interact with the coach, tour the campus with him/her, receive offers of aid, and engage in other 
recruiting conversation. These avenues are the hotbed for early recruiting. The lacrosse/softball 
legislation is purposeful in placing a hard boundary on any interaction until September 1st of 
junior year to seek to cut off the loopholes being exploited for early recruiting purposes. 
 Softball and lacrosse coaches are optimistic that this legislation will allow for high school 
athletes to focus more on developing and competing than the lure of the highly sought-after 
scholarship. Simultaneously, it will give coaches more time to evaluate players, see how they 
develop, and enter into recruiting conversations in a similar time frame with coaches from other 
institutions. The September 1st of junior year date will also move the college decision timeline 
much closer to the time frame when their peers are also considering college options. By moving 
this process back, it is believed that prospective student-athletes will be in a position to make a 
much more informed decision regarding elements like the kind of school they want to attend and 
what they want to study that they likely were not able to consider as 8th graders. According to the 
NFCA (2018) over 80% of members voted in favor of the changes, however, there remains a 
minority of coaches who are opposed for various reasons. The scope of this paper will be 
centered primarily on the interactions of the 80+% . 
 It can be expected that in the wake of enactment of this legislation there will be a little bit 
of a transition period. Youth, high school, and travel coaches as well as prospective student-
athletes have to take the time to figure out what the new rules mean for them. However, once all 
involved parties understand that rules of no contact mean no contact, they should adjust their 
behavior accordingly. Many coaches may already have verbal commitments from younger 
players that aren’t in their junior year yet. These commitments can still be honored, however, 
coaches and even committed players are not be permitted to contact one another until September 
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1st of the student’s junior year. Although coaches won’t be able to engage in recruiting 
conversation until junior year, they will likely still spend much of their evaluation time on 
sophomores and freshmen. Due to the fact that all 295 institutions are set loose to actively recruit 
on the same day, coaches will likely want to have a very good idea of which recruits they want to 
prioritize contacting right away to avoid losing them to another school.  
 Because “economics is about the efficient allocation of scarce resources and about 
making resources less scarce,” (Roth, 2015, p. 4), economic concepts can be used to examine and 
understand a wide range of interactions, decisions, and behaviors. The recruiting interaction is no 
different and can be evaluated using a familiar concept in economics known as “game theory”. 
Game theory is a scenario in which two (or more) parties are involved in strategic decision 
making—the “game”. In a simple version of game theory, two choices exist for each party (or 
“player” as commonly referred to in game theory). Each player’s outcome is dependent, not only 
on his own decision, but also on the decision of the other. A key assumption of this theory is that 
each player is in pursuit of the best possible outcome for himself. Prisoner’s Dilemma is a classic 
case of game theory in which a lack of trust moves both players to an outcome in which both are 
less well off than if they were able to trust each other. This lack of trust results in what 
economists call the “Nash Equilibrium”. The Nash Equilibrium in game theory is the outcome in 
which neither party is able to make themselves “better off” by only changing his decision. Under 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Nash Equilibrium is not the most preferred outcome for either party.  
Game theory invokes and relies heavily on the concept of payoffs. These payoffs are 
dependent on each players’ decision and can be measured in the terms of money, goods, or 
utility. “Utility” is the term in economics used to measure happiness. Utility is a unit-less 
measure which is only ordinal, not cardinal. Preferences are ranked in relationship to one another 
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from most to least preferred. This means any numbers associated with the concept of utility are 
trivial, yet useful to understand the order of preferences. Higher levels of utility, thus, equate to 
higher levels of “happiness” and are more preferred when compared to lower levels of utility.  
The purpose of this paper is to employ economic theory to examine the market for 
recruiting prospective student-athletes to collegiate softball. This will be done by relying heavily 
on Game Theory and Matching Markets as well as comparing the recruiting market to others 
which experienced similar failures. The intent of these applications is to arrive at a solution 
which allows the market to operate efficiently and would be acceptable to both coaches and 
prospects.  
Literature Review 
 Very little evaluation has been done examining this interaction in the realm of recruiting 
in collegiate athletics and particularly in regard to the recent legislation. However, there is 
similar literature exploring the concept of game theory in companies recruiting MBA (Master of 
Business Administration) students. The simplified model will be a starting place in considering 
the interactions in recruiting. Companies recruit MBA students as early as the fall of their first 
year in the program. “Despite the collective benefits of a later recruiting cycle, each company is 
individually incentivized to attempt to recruit and hire before its competitors, obtaining first pick 
of top talent,” (The Harbus, 2017). This is a classic case of Prisoner’s Dilemma. By each 
company acting in its own best interest, both companies are forced into a suboptimal position. In 
this case, it is recruiting very young and underdeveloped MBA students who have barely had a 
chance to explore career opportunities or even dig in to their masters’ studies. No governing 
body has been able to move this dilemma out of the established Nash Equilibrium and back to a 
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space that is preferred by companies and students alike. Below are game setups used by Malik in 
describing Prisoner’s Dilemma and the interactions in MBA recruiting which will be useful in 
understanding Prisoner’s Dilemma and the discussion on recruiting to follow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Prisoner's Dilemma Setup. Taken from “The Game Theory of Recruiting.” The Harbus, Harvard Business 
School, 19 Nov. 2017, www.harbus.org/2017/game-theory-recruiting/.  
 In the diagram on the left, Prisoner A and Prisoner B are each faced with two choices 
after their capture: to testify or not to testify. If both prisoners keep silent, both will be 
imprisoned for a year, because the judge has enough information to hold them, but not enough to 
give a heavier sentencing. However, the judge is willing to cut either one a deal: if either 
prisoner testifies against the other, the testifying prisoner will be released while the other is 
imprisoned for 10 years. But, if both prisoners try to take the deal (neither knows the decision 
being made by the other), each will be imprisoned for 8 years. If the prisoners could both keep 
silent, they would both only face one year in prison as opposed to the 8 they’ll have if they both 
testify. Yet, if one prisoner suspects the other will keep silent, it would be in his best own best 
interest to testify and be released. This self-serving decision-making moves to the Nash 
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Equilibrium where both testify and face 8 years in prison as a result. The same pattern of thought 
can be applied to the recruiting model on the right and for the models to follow in this paper. 
 In October of 2017, the NCAA published results from a survey taken by current student 
athletes concerning their recruiting process. For the sake of understanding the climate of the 
recruiting “market”, relevant charts from the publication are shown below.  
 
Chart 1 Men’s sports recruiting contact, taken from: Early Recruiting Survey Preliminary Results. NCAA Research, 5 Oct. 
2017, 
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017DIRes_DISAACEarlyRecruitingSurvey_%28Oct2017%29_FINAL_20171013.pdf. 
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Chart 2 Women’s sports recruiting contact, taken from: Early Recruiting Survey Preliminary Results. NCAA Research, 5 
Oct. 2017, 
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017DIRes_DISAACEarlyRecruitingSurvey_%28Oct2017%29_FINAL_20171013.pdf. 
 
 
Chart 3 Men’s Verbal Timings, taken from: Early Recruiting Survey Preliminary Results. NCAA Research, 5 Oct. 2017, 
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017DIRes_DISAACEarlyRecruitingSurvey_%28Oct2017%29_FINAL_20171013.pdf. 
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Chart 4 Women’s verbal timings, taken from: Early Recruiting Survey Preliminary Results. NCAA Research, 5 Oct. 2017, 
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017DIRes_DISAACEarlyRecruitingSurvey_%28Oct2017%29_FINAL_20171013.pdf. 
 
Chart 5 Breakdown of attitude toward recruitment process by sport, taken from: Early Recruiting Survey Preliminary 
Results. NCAA Research, 5 Oct. 2017, 
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017DIRes_DISAACEarlyRecruitingSurvey_%28Oct2017%29_FINAL_20171013.pdf. 
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Chart 6 Trend in commitment timings and attitude recruiting toward recruiting experience, taken from: Early Recruiting 
Survey Preliminary Results. NCAA Research, 5 Oct. 2017, 
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017DIRes_DISAACEarlyRecruitingSurvey_%28Oct2017%29_FINAL_20171013.pdf. 
 
 
Chart 7 Timings of commitment by sport, taken from: Early Recruiting Survey Preliminary Results. NCAA Research, 5 
Oct. 2017, 
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017DIRes_DISAACEarlyRecruitingSurvey_%28Oct2017%29_FINAL_20171013.pdf. 
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Chart 8 Prospects who enrolled somewhere besides where they originally committed, broken down by grade level, taken 
from: Early Recruiting Survey Preliminary Results. NCAA Research, 5 Oct. 2017, 
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017DIRes_DISAACEarlyRecruitingSurvey_%28Oct2017%29_FINAL_20171013.pdf. 
 
 
Chart 9 Uncertainty of intended major by grade level of prospect at time of commitment, taken from: Early Recruiting 
Survey Preliminary Results. NCAA Research, 5 Oct. 2017, 
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017DIRes_DISAACEarlyRecruitingSurvey_%28Oct2017%29_FINAL_20171013.pdf. 
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 There are several key indications that can be seen in these responses specifically for 
softball. First, as seen in Charts 1 and 2, softball had the first highest percentage of athletes who 
report recruiting contact beginning in 9th or 10th grade and (Charts 3 and 4) the second highest in 
verbal commitments during the same time frame, only behind men’s lacrosse (who were the first 
to see the need for legislative action). Seen in Chart 5, only 70% of collegiate softball players, 
with an average grade of 9.7 at the onset of recruiting contact, responded that the recruiting 
experience was a positive one for them. A positive correlation is shown in Chart 6 between later 
average commitments and more positive responses to their recruiting experience. Chart 7 shows 
the average time for commitment as 10.7, which is the second highest, again, only after men’s 
lacrosse. In the same chart, it shows a difference of 10.1 average commitment time for Power 5 
(“A5”) versus 10.8 for mid-major (“non-A5”). This almost nine-month difference can likely be 
attributed to a few different factors. First, it shows the Power 5 coaches’ willingness to eagerness 
to secure the best talent and highest prospects before their competitors. It also is indicative of the 
“trickle-down” that takes place in the recruiting process. Many prospects will hold off 
commitments to mid-major schools while hoping a Power 5 might give them an offer. It isn’t 
uncommon for prospects to commit to a mid-major only after they perceive they won’t receive a 
“better” offer.  
 The last two figures take a slightly different angle but will be important in making a case 
that bad matches tend to be made when recruits commit too early. Chart 8 shows the study’s 
findings that prospects who committed earlier had a higher likelihood of not enrolling in the 
institution to which they originally committed. The reasons they may not have enrolled there are 
negligible because regardless of the reasoning, it still indicated that the market moved too fast 
and bad matches were made as a result. The final chart shows the lack of information that 
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prospects had at the time of their commitment the younger they were. To anyone even slightly 
familiar with the concept of going to college, it is obvious that field of study is a key factor. 
However, younger prospects were more likely to have “no idea” what they wanted to study, 
again, leading to a higher likelihood of bad matches. These findings were instrumental in the 
initiative for NCAA recruiting changes across the board but were leveraged heavily in the pursuit 
of changes for softball.  
The Data 
 Necessary to assumptions made in this paper, it is important to understand that coaches 
have more than just perceived incentives to recruit earlier than competing coaches. To begin to 
make a case that recruiting early tends to payoff, data was collected on softball All-Americans 
from 2018 (All-Americans are the top-performing athletes across Division I, regardless of 
conference affiliations, nominated by and voted on coaches across the country.) Of the 54 All-
Americans, data was collected from athletes’ hometown publications or via direct contact on 47. 
Below is a chart outlining the breakdown of their school year when they made their initial verbal 
commitment.  
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Figure 3 2018 NFCA All-Americans by verball commitment timing 
 Former prospects that committed before their junior years of high school account for 74% 
of All-Americans from 2018. Of the five that committed during their senior years of high school, 
three were a part of non-Power 5 programs (herein referred to as “mid-major”). Of the other two, 
one was from abroad, explaining the delay in her recruiting timeline. (The only other foreign-
born All-American from 2018 also committed as a senior, but to a mid-major program). Leaving 
only one All-American, of 47, from 2018 that committed to a Power 5 as a senior. 
Simultaneously, only 11 All-Americans made their original commitment to a mid-major 
institution (one committed to a mid-major and was an All-American only after transferring to a 
Power 5, and one committed Power 5 and was an All-American only after transferring to a mid-
major.) 
 Note that this data reflects a correlation in early commitments and becoming an All-
American—not a causation relationship. Committing early is not what makes a player into an 
8th
8%
Freshman
26%
Sophomore
40%
Junior
15%
Senior
11%
2018 All-Americans Commitments
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All-American but is indicative that the quality of player being recruited and the payoff of 
securing prospects at an early age.  
It’s important to note that commitments creeping into 6th and 7th grade years is a 
phenomenon that has only begun to really emerge in the last 4-5 years. Players that committed in 
6th or 7th grade, likely still have not begun college (most are probably just entering high school as 
the trend toward earlier commitments has expanded in the last few years), which explains why 
no commitments before 8th grade are reflected in the All-American pool from 2018.  
Data was also collected and considered from lacrosse where the legislative changes have 
been in effect for an observable period of time. This data was collected from the 
InsideLacrosse.com Boys’ Commitment Database (2018). There was a sixteen-month period 
between the initial proposal from the lacrosse coaches, and the legislations’ approval and 
enactment by the NCAA. In the sixteen months immediately before the proposal, only six 
recruits were in the 8th grade when they committed, accounting for .89% of commitments. 
However, in the sixteen months after the proposal but before the approval and enactment of the 
new legislation (deemed the “critical period”), twenty-two commits were in the 8th grade, 2.5% 
of all commitments in that time period. After the enactment, 44% of commits were seniors and 
55% were juniors. The remaining 1% were sophomores. (A speculated explanation for a 
sophomore commitment after the new legislation is that the prospective student-athletes received 
an offer prior to the enactment of the legislation and accepted the offer after its implementation.) 
The same sort of “mad rush” to commit prospects whom it would soon be impermissible 
to contact is likely to have taken place during the critical period for softball as well. The 
University of Florida committed then 11-year-old Alexia Carrasquillo in January of 2018—just a 
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month after the proposal by the NFCA. After considering her decision for a month after 
receiving an offer from Florida coach Tim Walton, Carraquillo became the youngest athlete to 
commit to a university, in any sport, ever (Sievers, 2018).  
The Game 
First, assume competing coaches at two institutions which are located in the same 
geographic region, compete in the same athletic conference, and are both in favor of the new 
legislation. Such assumptions allow for a logical progression of thought in which each is able to 
observe the actions of the other as well as increase the likelihood that each institution is 
competing for recruits within a similar pool of prospective student-athletes. We will also assume 
that this interaction operates as a “repeated game”. 1 This means that the game is expected to be 
an interaction that occurs indefinitely and thus can affect how individuals behave.  
 The pre-legislation recruiting environment engaged kids as early as 6th and 7th grade. For 
the scope of this paper, “early” recruiting will continue to be defined as recruiting interactions 
that take place prior to a prospective student-athlete’s first day of 11th grade.  
 Because both coaches are in favor of the new rules, the payoffs in the game for both are 
the same and ordered from most preferable to least preferable in terms of utility as listed below. 
Note, while each coach is in favor of the new rules, both have a most favored outcome of 
                                                           
1 There are instances where the assumption of a repeated game may be stripped away from a coaches’ decision 
making, specifically in the case of the new legislation. A single-shot game approach could be present if a coach 
doesn’t plan to remain at a given institution (risk securing prized recruits to be more successful and land a better job 
or is indifferent to remaining in coaching long term). If any given coach approaches the game as a single-shot game, 
he or she has increased likelihood of cheating—if he gets away with it, he wins; if he gets caught, the punishment 
doesn’t bother him.  
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recruiting earlier while the competing coach does not because of the perceived benefit of being 
able to secure prized recruits before competing coaches.  
Coach A and Coach J’s Preferences (in favor of new legislation) 
 4: Recruit early while the competing coach does not  
 3: Don’t recruit early while competing coach also does not 
 2: Recruit early while competing coach also recruits early 
1: Don’t recruit early while competing coach does  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As seen in the figure above, each coach’s individual decision to recruit early takes the 
outcome away from an ideal outcome where neither party recruits early. This is because there is 
at least a perceived advantage for each party individually in moving away from not recruiting 
early, eventually landing in a space where both do.  
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To understand how that happens, consider a recruiting environment only between these 
two coaches where neither coach is recruiting early. One day, Coach J realizes that there is 
benefit for him to recruit early, under the assumption that Coach A will continue to not recruit 
early. Coach J then gets the benefit of what he believes to be priority recruitment of younger 
prospective student-athletes. However, even if Coach A also was deciding to recruit early, it 
would still be in Coach J’s best interest to also recruit early or risk losing all priority recruitment 
to Coach A. This moves both parties to their second least preferred outcome where both are 
recruiting early. 
The example above is an extremely simplified version of the game for the sake of 
understanding only the decision to recruit early or not. It is modeled simply to understand coach 
behavior without yet considering how decisions of prospects play into understanding the 
interactions.  
How the Game Changes 
Under the recent legislation, however, the game is forced away from the established Nash 
Equilibrium. The NCAA, as the regulating body of the game, in theory, moves both players back 
to the “Not Early” decision, the most desirable of sustainable alternatives given the 
aforementioned setup. Under the assumption that neither player cheats, all parties are said to be 
better off. As long as the game operates as an indefinitely repeated game, this should be a 
sustainable outcome. Now, neither coach has a motivation to move away from the “not early” 
option. The NCAA’s interference, in essence, is taking away the “recruit early” option.  
However, each party does still have an incentive to cheat. A player may cheat if the perceived 
reward from doing so outweighs some function of the consequence for doing so and the 
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likelihood of being caught. The NCAA operates primarily as an overseer which relies heavily on 
the self-policing of their constituents. For that reason, there are several interactions, or cases of 
“cheating”, that may be difficult to detect.  
One example of cheating that could realistically go unreported would be interactions and 
impermissible conversations with a prospective student-athlete’s coaches. Under the legislation, 
coaches are not permitted to say anything outside of “I am interested in Player A” and “I am not 
interested in Player B”. Even saying “I am very interested in Player A” falls under impermissible 
action under the new rules. Assuming the player’s coach wants to act in whatever is believed to 
be in the best interest of all of his/her players, it is unlikely that he or she would report a college 
coach for stepping outside of what established permissible behavior.   
Cheating could also realistically take place at camps where coaches are permitted to talk 
to prospective athletes of all ages within the scope of the camp. However, in the same way, 
conversations that venture outside of the scope of what is permissible would also be difficult to 
detect. 
Especially because the NCAA relies so heavily on self-reporting, the new legislation is 
heavily dependent on coaches’ commitment to act ethically and within the bounds of the rules. 
This idea is not specific to the new rules regarding recruiting, but most of the rules the NCAA 
has put into effect. Each school has an athletic compliance department that is responsible for 
making sure coaches and administrators act in accordance with NCAA rules. By and large, the 
new recruiting legislation is expected to be followed. However, when a coach detects it may be 
more beneficial to curtail the rules in pursuit of a “game-changing” recruit, cheating could be 
expected.  
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Why Some Coaches Are Opposed to Legislation 
 The proposal and subsequent approval received a staggering amount of support from 
Division I coaches as well as the softball community as a whole. That does not negate the reality 
that for a myriad of reasons there are a handful of coaches that are opposed to the recent changes.  
 The bulk of this opposition comes from coaches of mid-major programs. Mid-major 
programs, in general, are at an automatic disadvantage in recruiting interactions, specifically 
when it comes to the most coveted prospects. According to a study conducted by the NCAA in 
2017, the average timing of commitment for a softball student-athlete to a Power 5 school was 
10.1 grade, versus 10.8 for non-Power 5 schools (NCAA). Apparent in this fact is the reality that 
Power 5 on average secure commitments eight-nine months earlier than their non-Power 5 
competitors. Softball is one of only six (out of fifteen NCAA sponsored sports) to have a 
difference of at least half a year between average Power 5 and non-Power 5 commitments. 
Further, the study showed that 38% of student-athletes that committed in 10th grade or earlier 
didn’t even end up enrolling in the school to which they originally committed.  
 In recent years, as recruiting and verbal commitments have crept earlier and earlier, some 
mid-major programs claim to be surviving on a particular crop of prospects deemed “late 
bloomers.” The Power 5 programs have been the ones leading the charge in securing recruits 
even into their middle school years. As a result, when an athlete reaches, say, her junior year, 
most Power 5 programs have already promised out all their scholarship money for that class. 
This is where mid-major programs have been able to win out with prospects that have developed 
further into their high school careers. Because of this, there exists a school of thought amongst 
some mid-major coaches that the new legislation favors the Power 5 in this realm. By lining up 
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all Division I schools at the same starting line on September 1, Power 5 programs will now be in 
a position to scoop up some of the late bloomers they may have otherwise missed out on. 
(Anonymous, personal communication, December, 2017). However, Power 5 programs could 
continue to put higher priority on prospects they have been watching longer and still pass on the 
seemingly riskier choice of the late bloomer. Regardless of whether or not this train of thought is 
accurate, it is a popular argument for mid-major coaches who are opposed to the changes 
 Coaches are also generally opposed in some capacity because of the unknown. There are 
plenty of opinions on how the new legislation may flesh out in different areas, yet no one can 
define exactly how it will play out in reality. This will force all coaches, in some capacity, to 
change how they approach recruiting. Systems and approaches and thoughts of the past will have 
to be altered to accommodate the new restrictions. Coaches that once spent recruiting time 
watching mostly 8th graders may have to transition to watching sophomores. Coaches that 
banked on a 2-3 year window to communicate with prospects before giving determining whether 
or not to offer them scholarships will have to find new ways to get to know them in a much 
shorter window.  
 While there exists some level of opposition, much of the opposition would be at bay with 
a September 1 of sophomore year date to begin recruiting. For whatever reason, coaches that are 
opposed claim to be more in favor of a date moved just one year earlier. Claiming that this will 
affect their recruiting strategy less, they believe they could be on board for such changes.  
The Game When One Coach is Opposed 
 Due to the landscape of recruiting, the game could also be observed (in a simplified, two-
coach interaction model) between a coach that is in favor of the legislation and a coach who is 
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not. The game will be evaluated using these coaches’ attitudes on the legislation to reveal their 
preferences, but assumed first that they are interacting before the enactment of the changes. 
Note, again, that both coaches’ most preferred outcome is to recruit early while the other coach 
does not. Notice that each coach’s second and third favored outcome are flipped compared to the 
other’s while most and least preferred alternatives are the inverse. Coach A will again be in favor 
of the new legislation, while Coach S is opposed. Coach A’s preference remain unchanged from 
the previous model, while Coach S’s preferences are ordered below.  
Coach S’s Preferences (opposed to new legislation) 
4: Recruit early while competing coach does not 
3: Recruit early while competing coach also recruits early 
2: Don’t recruit early while competing coach also does not 
1: Don’t recruit early while competing coach does 
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 Without the legislation changes, when coaches act in their own best interest, as 
economics assumes, the Nash Equilibrium again arrives in a spot where both coaches recruit 
early. In this interaction, Coach S is better off than she is with the intervention of the NCAA and 
the new legislation. Conversely, Coach A is worse off under the natural Nash Equilibrium, and 
better off when the NCAA imposes the legislation.  
However, the consequences for cheating behavior are vague at best. As explained by the 
NFCA Educational Material, “Like all other allegations of NCAA rules violations, the coach 
and/or program will need to be turned into the compliance office and penalties are determined 
based on multiple factors. Some penalties include no longer being able to recruit the student-
athlete and, in some instances, can result in the termination of the offending coach. Many 
coaches have NCAA rules violations provisions in their contracts, so intentional or repeated 
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recruiting violations could be cause for termination.” While the gamut of potential consequences 
is seemingly unlimited, it is difficult to say definitively how coaches may respond. It is important 
to note, however, that “cheating” could not necessarily take the form of contacting recruits and 
securing commitments before the allowed date but could also look like impermissible 
conversations with prospects’ coaches before the allowed date. Such kind of violations would 
likely be seen as “minor” in the eyes of the NCAA, and as such, are much more likely to take 
place. However, due to the potential severity (termination) of violations as well, coaches will 
likely avoid blatant violations. The payoff to win more games by securing a prized recruit would 
be irrelevant if the coach is fired for being caught violating the rules.  
The Game When Both Coaches are Opposed 
When both coaches are opposed to the new legislation and prefer to recruit earlier than 
September 1 of prospects’ junior years they have identical preferences. Coach S’s preferences 
will remain the same as in the above model and Coach M’s preferences will be the same.  
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The natural, ungoverned interactions between these two coaches that are both opposed to 
the new legislation would result in a Nash Equilibrium where both recruits early. However, when 
the NCAA enters as the governing body and enforces the recent changes to the rules, the coaches 
are forced into an equilibrium where neither recruit early and each is less well-off under their 
given preferences.  
 Regardless of the preferences of the coaches interacting in the game, each scenario ends 
up in the same Nash Equilibrium where both coaches are recruiting early—including those who 
claim to not want to. This explains much of why early recruiting became such a widespread 
phenomenon and has gotten to a place where the NCAA has been pushed to step in and regulate 
it. 
Matching Markets 
While the aforementioned setups give a fair representation of the interactions that take 
place, all are limited to explaining only one side of the market. The models used above would be 
sufficient in traditional markets where an equilibrium is achieved on the basis of supply and 
demand. The coach would “buy” the best recruits each was able to afford and recruits would be 
“allocated” accordingly. However, in recruiting, each party (the coach and the prospective 
student athlete) has to agree in order for a transaction to take place—a decision that can be 
thought of as mutually exclusive. A coach has a pool of potential recruits. Within her pool, there 
are different calibers of players—each “commodity” (prospect) is not identical to another. With 
that in mind, a coach has preferences from most to least preferred. Simultaneously, each prospect 
is not faced with identical packages from different coaches. A slew of factors will impact a 
prospect’s decision, so she, likewise, has programs she would prefer over others.  
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Economists have deemed these markets where each party has to agree in a transaction as 
“matching markets”. Contrary to popular belief in the collegiate coaching circle, the problem of 
early recruiting is not one that is unique to sport. Alvin Roth, winner of a Nobel Prize in 
Economics in 2012, has done extensive research and analysis concerning this idea. In his book, 
Who Gets What—And Why, he explains a range of matching markets from competitive clerkship 
offers to law students, to college Bowl Game selections, to residency program placements for 
aspiring doctors. A trend amongst each of these markets, which has become a glaring trend in 
recruiting as well, is that each slowly inched to an earlier and earlier timeline, arriving at a place 
of “failure” because it is less than ideal for both parties. Generally, coaches would rather wait 
longer before committing to a recruit to see how a she develops throughout her high school 
career. Recruits, likewise, would rather wait longer to be able to gather more information and 
gauge interest from different programs and make an educated selection at an age-appropriate 
time. “That’s one of the dangers associated with early transactions:” Roth says, “they can come 
before important information is available. And that can mean bad matches made and good ones 
missed,” (60). Not only that, but making matches early means that coaches are making 
commitments when they don’t know what the landscape of their team will be in five years when 
the prospect finally enrolls. Players may quit or get hurt, leaving positions that need to be filled 
before anticipated.  
However, much like in the matching markets examined by Roth, the pressure for coaches 
to secure top prospects has encouraged them toward committing them earlier and earlier in recent 
years. Simultaneously, prospects began to face more and more pressure to accept offers from a 
particular school or else risk the offer being rescinded if they waited. Roth explains “college 
admissions and labor markets are more than a little like courtship and marriage: each is a two-
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sided matching market that involves searching and wooing on both sides. A market involves 
matching whenever price isn’t the only determinant of who gets what,” (2015, p. 6).  
 At its core, the failure in the recruiting market is a problem Roth deems “unravelling”. He 
defines unravelling as a failure of self-control—“participants just can’t stop themselves from 
transacting early, because if they resist the urge, they’ll lose out to someone else,” (Roth, 2015, 
p. 67).  As of September of 2018, there are already rumors of coaches contacting prospects at 
midnight of September 1, the earliest they possibly could under the new legislation from the 
NCAA. The key difference between the recruiting market and many of the markets explained by 
Roth is that the NCAA is a governing body with the ability to enforce high levels of punishment 
on its constituents for cheating. With that in mind, it is slightly more promising that this 
intervention could hold up, unlike similar fixes in many other matching markets. However, as 
mentioned previously, in the face of a big-time recruit and in a market where cheating is difficult 
to detect, it would not be surprising for a coach to act in his or her best interest in risking early 
contact.  
 This risky interaction is made even more complex because of the nature of the matching 
market. In a commodity market, the commodity does not care (or even notice) if the “purchaser” 
cheats in obtaining it. However, in a matching market, the prospect is able to recognize cheating 
behaviors should a coach choose to engage in them. The coaches’ behavior is what economists 
refer to as a “signal”. A prospect may or may not be able to clearly determine the kind of person 
a coach is or the kind of character her or she embodies, but a decision to evade the rules (cheat) 
could be interpreted as a signal of poor personal character. For prospects to whom the quality of 
character of the coach is an important factor in the decision-making process, attempting to 
transact early could actually hurt the coach’s chances of making a successful match. Not to 
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mention the potential for the prospect (or her family or friends) to be the one to report the 
violation to the NCAA. Because the recruiting interaction acts much like the one for a job 
interview, both parties are in a position where they have to rely on signals from the other. The 
signal given by a coach willing to cheat on the rules could be that he or she is unethical, willing 
to win at any cost, or thinks he or she is above rules. Any of these signals received by a prospect 
could sway her decision because of the perceived character of person she would be committing 
to play for.  On the converse, there are prospects who would be flattered by a coach’s willingness 
to circumvent the rules. The signal could instead be interpreted that the coach is views the 
prospect as “worth the risk” or that he or she highly values winning. Some players could 
interpret those characteristics as positive characteristics and be swayed to also evade the rules. 
This is of course hard for a recruiting coach to detect before gambling on it and as such, further 
adds to the risk of the cheating behavior. 
Failures in Matching Markets 
Roth identifies four common problems this kind of market can face which lead to market 
failure. These failures arise because the market 1) is too risky 2) gets congested 3) moves too fast 
and 4) moves too soon (or any combination of the four mentioned problems). When a market is 
too risky, individuals don’t want to participate in transactions. This can look like the threat of 
physical harm or danger in making a transaction or not trusting the market to make a sustainable 
and acceptable match. A market gets congested when a party has to wait on the decision of 
another after an extended offer and in the meantime, is missing out on other potential matches 
while they wait. A market moves too fast when offers become “exploding”—meaning recipients 
have a very short period of time in which they can accept or decline offers, both of which can be 
risky decisions. Finally, a market moves too soon when the fear of missing out on ideal matches 
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encourages one party to begin to seek out a match earlier than competitors, continually pushing 
the timeline earlier in order to secure the match. The recruiting market does not appear to be 
inherently risky, however, it is not difficult to see how each of these problems can be seen in the 
market.  
Congestion, a problem that existed before the new legislation, is one that will continue as 
a prospect takes her time to consider individual offers while a coach has to wait to see if she 
accepts before offering the same scholarship money to another prospect. Congestion is a problem 
which is left almost completely unaltered with the legislative changes and will continue to keep 
the recruiting market from operating efficiently.  
The market clearly moved too soon prior to the legislation. Implementing this date for 
contact is the NFCA and NCAA’s attempt to move the process back to a “more appropriate” 
time frame. However, under legislation changes, it could still be expected that coaches will 
continually inch earlier to a point where they are contacting prospects at midnight on September 
1st (the absolute earliest the legislation allows)2. Generally, the definitive date for contact in 
recruiting can be expected to solve the problem of the market moving too soon, which was its 
aim.  
In general, the market didn’t move too fast in regard to exploding offers before the 
legislation. Because the process started for many prospects at a young age, it would have been 
abnormal to hear of a coach giving a prospect a day, or even a week, to consider the offer before 
accepting or declining it. However, this is a potential problem that will being to arise because 
congestion is still present. Now, though, coaches don’t have three or four years for the process, 
                                                           
2 At the time of this paper, about a month after the first September 1 under the new rules, rumors have already 
circulated that some coaches did actually contact recruits at midnight.  
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they have two or less. In all likelihood, coaches will not be willing to wait very long to get an 
answer from a prospect they have extended an offer to. The result will likely be “exploding 
offers” where prospects are given a very short timeline (as short as a few hours if it operates 
anything like many of the markets Roth studies) in order to make a decision.  
Another separate, but key problem with the legislation is operates as self-reporting 
system. As a result, those who follow the rules get passed up by those who didn’t when the 
regulating (NCAA) agency can’t process or track information. This means that coaches who are 
able to engage in activity that is cheating under the new rules, but fly under the radar, are likely 
to gain an upper-hand on those who don’t. This incentivizes some cheating behavior—at the very 
least that which coaches deem to be in the “gray area” of the rules. The most likely cheating 
behavior, again, is engaging in otherwise impermissible conversations with or asking 
impermissible questions of a prospect’s coach.   
How the Recruiting Market Operates Like the Residency Market 
 To better understand each of these problems in matching markets, as well as how the 
recruiting market is a matching market, consider one example from Roth. The market is that for 
medical school students to residency programs at a hospital3. Already, there are several 
similarities. There are many medical students that desire to be matched to a program, just as 
there are many high school softball players that desire to be matched to university to play 
softball. A residency program initiates offers for residencies to a handful of medical students 
                                                           
3 Residency placements have been a typical component of doctoral training since about 1900 and are a requirement 
to becoming licensed to practice medicine. Residents are helpful to hospitals because they act as a sort of cheap 
labor as well as potential full-time hires upon completion of residency. Medical students/graduates need a resident 
placement in order to gain field training as well as to fulfill requirements, and the better placements they can obtain, 
the better job outlook after their completion, whether at the same hospital or another.  
ECONOMICS OF RECRUITING 
 
 32 
each year, just as a softball coach recruits a handful of players for each year. Some hospitals and 
programs have a better reputation than others, just as some universities have better 
reputation/appeal than others. As a result, medical students and prospective student athletes alike 
have preferences for matches they would prefer over others.  
 As the residency “market” grew more commonplace over the course of the early 1900s, it 
naturally grew more competitive. According to Roth (2015) by the 1940’s, offers were being 
made to students with as much as two years of medical school left to be completed. This case of 
the market moving too soon (as aforementioned), was clearly less than ideal for both the 
hospitals and the students. Hospitals were gambling on students that showed some initial promise 
without any certainty of how they would develop in later classes and what their interests might 
be. Similarly, students were locking in to programs without a cultivated idea of what they may 
want to specialize in. This, unsurprisingly, resulted in bad matches.  
 The recruiting market has been operating in much the same way. While offers will 
continue to be made while prospects have two years of high school left, the recruiting market had 
moved even further, reaching to students that hadn’t even entered high school yet. In much the 
same train of thought, prospects could not have a good idea of what they would want to study in 
college (an otherwise obvious factor when choosing a university). Coaches, like the hospitals, 
were gambling by obtaining commits from players that show potential as seventh and eighth 
graders—prospects whom oftentimes had their offers rescinded as juniors or seniors if the 
college coach didn’t like how they developed. While some good matches were made, as seen in 
the data collected on All-Americans, there were some bad matches, as well as untapped “late 
bloomers” who played at lower level universities. Again, bad matches were made. 
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 In 1945, the residency market attempted a fix which echoed much of the legislation 
enacted for the recruiting market. Change finally began to take place when “a third party—
medical schools—agreed not to release information about students before a specified date, was 
the timing of offers controlled,” (Roth, 2015, p. 135). Note that the recruiting interaction, 
composed primarily of interactions between coaches and prospects, also required a third-party 
interaction from the NCAA to control the timing of offers. What happened next, and what could 
reasonably be expected in the recruiting market as well, is the problem of moving too fast. 
Exploding offers became more and more common as hospitals didn’t want to lose out on their 
second-tier candidate options if their first tier took their time to ultimately decline an offer. 
Ultimately, the market arrived at a place where the problem of early offers was fixed, but they 
were faced with a completely new problem, which still led to an inefficient market where bad 
matches were made.  
“The Match” 
 Once the market unraveled, again, by attempting to control the timing of offers a 
completely different kind of fix was implemented. Rather than trying to control either party with 
restrictions and withholding information, the market sought a way in which good matches could 
be made for both parties. The answer for a sustainable residency market—a clearinghouse 
system, “The Match”.  This system, cited by Roth to be deemed the “deferred acceptance 
algorithm”, was developed by David Gale and Lloyd Shipley. A stable outcome of matches is 
achieved under this system where no “blocking pairs” exist. A blocking pair would be where two 
parties would both prefer each other over the match they were given. This means “there aren’t 
any applicants and employers that aren’t matched to each other but that both wish they were,” 
(Roth, 2015, p. 142). 
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The clearinghouse system starts with candidates and hospitals both submit an ordered list 
of their preferred choices into the database. Then the algorithm does the rest. That algorithm 
goes through each party’s preferences one at a time. The system first matches to the hospital 
their most preferred candidates and applicants tentatively accept the offer ranked highest in their 
preferences. Next, employers that have had offers rejected extend offers to the next tier of 
applicants. If an applicant receives an offer that ranked higher on his or her preference list, the 
tentative acceptance of the first is withdrawn and the more preferred offer is now tentatively 
accept. And so the process continues until no offer is rejected. This whole process, after 
applicants and employers submit their preference list, happens within The Match, and both 
parties are given only the final results (they don’t know what offers were tentatively accepted 
and later rescinded within the process). The outcome of The Match does not force either party 
into that match but has been proven to create the best outcomes for both parties when accurate 
preferences are submitted. “The Match”, first implemented with this algorithm in 1962, remains 
in use for residency placements today.4 
“The Match” and Recruiting  
 The natural question to follow is, would this solution work in the recruiting market? One 
of the most notable difference between the market for softball players and that for medical 
students is the need for specialization within a team. In the residency market, programs are 
specialized by nature. For instance, a pediatric residency would be preferred by students desiring 
to enter into pediatrics. On the contrary, all coaches are offering essentially the same 
“opportunity”—to play college softball. Within that opportunity, a coach needs matches with 
                                                           
4 The Match underwent some slight modifications (led by Roth) in the 70’s to account for married couples seeking 
residencies in the same area. The process for singles remains the same and is the pattern of thought that will be 
employed in evaluating the system in terms of the recruiting market.  
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slightly different “specialties”—pitchers, catchers, infielders, outfielders. One side of the market 
under the clearinghouse system could be compared to making an auto-draft list of options in 
fantasy football. If a fantasy owner puts a quarterback as his top four preferences in an auto-
draft, there is a possibility that he could end up with four quarterbacks, when he really only 
needed one or two. Even if he spaces out his quarterback preferences with other positions, if the 
players he puts in between them get chosen before his next quarterback, he could still end up 
with more than he needs. Taking that train of thought, a coach in the recruiting market would 
have to very carefully indicate the order of absolute preferences under The Match as it exists 
currently, and still possibly end up with too many players for any given position and not enough 
of another. A potential, simple fix for this that would allow the clearinghouse system to be a 
legitimate possibility would be to have different list preferences based on position. A coach 
could indicate how many players from a given category they are wanting to recruit in a given 
year and then be matched in each pool accordingly. 
 While The Match points to an outcome that is sustainable and efficient for the recruiting 
market, it is not likely that it would be met without opposition. Coaches would likely have 
trouble giving up the illusion of control, even if matches proposed by the system were non-
binding. Coaches, and players, would have to trust the system and be willing to submit their true 
order of preferences in order for the system to work. If any group of coaches were unwilling to 
partake in the system, it wouldn’t work because matches made outside of the system would 
interfere with its ability to make matches based on preferences of both parties involved. 
However, if coaches were somehow able to buy in to the clearinghouse system, recruits would 
follow suit.  
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 While the presence of an automated matching system dependent on preferences can be 
trusted to make initially good matches, it does not mean that it will eradicate players quitting, 
transferring, or being cut. The recruiting interaction, again, is one of limited information. As 
such, coaches and players alike don’t have a complete picture of the person or atmosphere they 
are committing to—each show only what he or she wants the other to see. As a result, problems 
can still arise that cause players or coaches to no longer wish to continue to work together, and 
transferring, quitting, or getting cut can be the result. Similarly, players can develop quickly in 
college to a level which makes them a good match for a higher-level program. These players, 
too, could still end up transferring before graduating from the program they were initially 
matched with.  
 In order for this system to work in combatting early recruiting and exploding offers, 
recruits could take their entire junior year to explore options, go on visits, and interact with 
coaches. By a specified date, likely around the beginning of their senior years, coaches and 
prospects could enter their preferences into the system and receive their best matches. Recruits 
would make their decisions all at the same time, removing the exploding offer and naturally 
taking away the coach’s incentive to recruit them earlier knowing prospects won’t make a 
decision before the clearinghouse can offer the best match.  
 However, did this market already have essentially the same algorithm, played out over 
time in real life rather than instantaneously within the confines of a clearinghouse system? 
Consider the idea of the “verbal commitment”. This common component of the recruiting 
process has been employed, and generally upheld, in recruiting interactions in softball in recent 
history. Remember that a verbal commitment is said to be non-binding on either party and is not 
even recognized by the NCAA. As such, there is no enforceable punishment on either coaches or 
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players for withdrawing their verbal commitment—a part of the process the matching system 
would do on its own in the algorithm to arrive at the best matches. However, because these 
commitments have had a tendency to be upheld and give a perception of “locking in” a given 
recruit, the process has continued to move earlier across the board prior to the legislative 
changes. This is in large part because of ethical considerations of both parties. However, if 
coaches and players really looked at the verbal commitment as it is defined, as non-binding, 
would the result be matches which look much more similar to the ones arrived at under a 
clearinghouse like The Match? If coaches knew that verbal commitments they received were 
genuinely non-binding, both ethically and legally, there could be removed incentive to recruit 
early. At any time, a better offer could come along, and the recruit would be (and feel) free to 
decommit from one program commit to the one which she prefers more. As a result, coaches 
would waste much time and effort recruiting players at too young of an age.  
 The most likely problem that coaches would have with both a clearinghouse like The 
Match and in a shifted view of the verbal commitment stems from a fundamental difference in 
these two markets. While competition exists in some forms between hospitals for prestige, 
grants, or status, they don’t tend to compete head-to-head the way college softball programs 
exist. At the core, hospitals operate to help patients—to save lives. Softball teams, however, 
operate with the goal of winning championships. Because winning championships is exclusive 
and requires creating the best team, coaches don’t necessarily clear the market “clears” or 
operates efficiently. If a coach can secure a recruit that, in theory, could play at a “bigger” 
school, he wins. It is likely less important to a coach that good matches are made throughout the 
country than it is that he gets the best commits for his program to be in the best position to win a 
championship. Many of the problems discussed in the scope of this paper could be addressed if 
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coaches were more concerned with the market as a whole and the best matches for all parties 
involved than just his own team. However, coaching and intercollegiate sport is highly 
competitive and winning in head-to-head matchups is mutually exclusive—one team wins and 
one team loses. The vast majority of coaches are tend to care much more about being on the 
winning side of that deal than on every prospect and every other school receiving the best match. 
For Further Investigation 
 As is always the case in the social sciences, the applications of theories and outcomes 
from other markets are educated speculation of how the recruiting market will respond in the 
wake of the legislative changes. Research should be collected in the future as to how it plays out 
in reality. Does the market arrive at sustainable outcomes consistently? Do coaches act in 
accordance with the rules? Can cheating behavior be detected? Would a matching system, like 
the one implemented in the residency market, be a viable option? Is it something coaches could 
be on board with, or interested in learning more about? Survey data could be collected regarding 
coaches’ attitude toward the system. However, a solid understanding of the problems faced in 
other markets, troubles faced in other attempted fixes similar to the new legislation, how The 
Match really works would be necessary to gain any kind of traction amongst coaches. Survey 
data could also be collected on coaches’ and players’ ideas of removing the ethical enforcement 
of the verbal commitment and returning to a system, not regulated by a specified start date, 
where a matching system would be able to play out naturally. 
   
  
ECONOMICS OF RECRUITING 
 
 39 
Appendix A: 2018 All-American Commitment Timings 
Mid-Major? University, Conference Grade at 
commitment  
University of Washington, Pac12 8th  
Michigan University, Big10 8th  
University of Georgia, SEC 8th  
Florida State University, ACC 8th  
University of Tennessee, SEC freshman  
Oklahoma University, Big12 freshman  
University of Florida, SEC freshman  
Oklahoma University, Big12 freshman  
University of Oregon, PAC freshman  
Texas A&M, SEC freshman  
University of California Los Angeles, PAC freshman  
Northwestern University, Big10 freshman  
University of Texas, BIG12 freshman  
University of Washington, Pac12 freshman  
University of Georgia, SEC freshman  
Oklahoma University, Big12 freshman 
 University of Oregon, PAC sophomore 
 Arizona State University, PAC sophomore 
 University of Florida, SEC sophomore 
 University of Arizona, PAC sophomore 
 University of California Los Angeles, PAC sophomore 
 Oklahoma State, Big12 sophomore 
 University of Georgia, SEC sophomore 
 University of Minnesota, Big10 sophomore 
 University of Alabama, SEC sophomore 
Yes Texas State, Sunbelt sophomore 
Yes James Madison University, Colonial sophomore 
 University of Tennessee, SEC sophomore 
 University of Michigan, Big10 sophomore 
 Oregon University, PAC sophomore 
 transfer from Utah to Kennesaw (Power to mid) sophomore 
 University of Florida, SEC sophomore 
Yes University of Houston, AAC sophomore 
 Florida State University, ACC sophomore 
Yes University of Houston, AAC sophomore 
 Louisiana State University, SEC sophomore  
Yes Original commitment to Florida Atlantic University, 
Conference USA; All-American only as graduate transfer 
to Florida State University, ACC 
sophomore 
 University of Oregon, PAC junior 
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 Baylor University, Big12 junior 
Yes Drake University, MVC junior 
Yes Brigham Young University, West Coast junior 
Yes Elon University, Colonial junior 
Yes James Madison University Colonial junior 
 Commit to University of Tennessee, SEC; All-American at 
Long Beach State University, Big West 
junior 
Yes Kent State, American senior 
Yes Eastern Kentucky University, OVC senior  
University of Washington, Pac 12 senior 
Yes Gardner Webb, Big South senior 
 
Boston College, ACC senior 
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Appendix B: Lacrosse Commitments 
16 Months Pre-Proposal 
Classification at Commitment Number of Commitments Percentage of Commitments 
Senior 85 12.57% 
Junior 223 32.99% 
Sophomore 233 34.47% 
Freshman 127 18.79% 
8th 6 0.89% 
    
 
Post Graduate  2 0.30% 
Total 676 
 
 
 
  
15 Month Critical Period 
Classification at Commitment Number of Commitments Percentage of Commitments 
Senior 191 21.73% 
Junior 329 37.43% 
Sophomore 234 26.62% 
Freshman 94 10.69% 
8th 22 2.50% 
    
 
Post Graduate 9 1.02% 
Total 879 
 
14 Months Post-Legislation Enactments 
Classification at Commitment Number of Commitments Percentage of Commitments 
Seniors 358 43.55% 
Junior 450 54.74% 
Sophomore 14 1.70% 
Freshman 0 0.00% 
8th 0 0.00% 
    
 
Post Graduate 0 0.00% 
Total 822 
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